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Pedagogy of the ‘not’: Negation, exodus, and postdigital temporal regimes  
 
Abstract: Postdigital capitalist time is characterized by an incessant acceleration that 
homogenizes time and weds us to the present by making it so we have to constantly catch up and 
re/learn relearn the latest apps, social media configurations, operating systems, and so on. This 
reinforces imperialism, blocks resistance, and ensnares us in the present. To short-circuit this, I 
articulate an exo-exopedagogy to suspend postdigital time and free our subjectivity from its 
ensarement in the present. This provides an alternative educational mode of life to the lifelong 
learning apparatus that sustains postdigital capitalist time. Specifically, I turn to the “not,” a 
fundamental and omnipresent word whose radical potential lies in its ability to clear out 
oppositions and open up a radical indeterminancy that is always untimely. Reading Paolo 
Virno’s work on negation and exodus, I argue that negation entails an exodus from exopedagogy, 
one that alters the meaning and categories from which exopedagogy withdraws. As a concrete 
example of exo-exopedagogy, I offer a factional struggle inside the New York City Teachers 
Union. Before concluding, I spend some time with Sandy Grande’s important critiques of 
Eurocentrism and progress in western critical education. I do this to demonstrate how a 
pedagogy of the not helps circumvent these past errors through its accommodation of—or, better, 
insistence on—variegated temporalities. 
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In the postdigital age, anything seems possible but everything seems impossible. On the 
one hand, any group can start a trending hashtag and radically intervene in and redirect a 
segment of popular discourse. Disparate groups of organizers and militants can connect, build, 
and coordinate actions and campaigns, linking different movements and spaces together into one 
(think Occupy). On the other hand, capital and state powers make their own interventions, 
blocking or demoting news sites critical of their power, or cutting off—or, in the case of Iran in 
2009, not cutting off—service.1 Even without considering the massive state and capital 
intervention in the digital age, we can still find the basis of this contradictory feeling of 
possibility and impossibility. The rapidity of the rise and fall of trending hashtags and their 
frequency of turnover makes the impact tenuous at best and doomed at worst. The intensity of 
the momentum of social movements or critiques is followed just as soon by naysays and 
movement critics.  
The digitization of life began as a deeply contradictory process. The internet, which 
promised openness and equality only exacerbated economic and political inequality. As we use it 
to generate new connections, knowledges, and even political actions, our connections are 
expropriated by the corporations that own the digital platforms and other vital infrastructure 
(Dean, 2009). And while it was built by hackers and amateurs, it was a massive state and military 
operation (Jandrić & Barbrook, 2017). I begin here by emphasizing these contradictions because, 
as Gregory Bourassa (2018) reminds us, the stories we tell about capitalism “register certain 
political sensibilities at a given moment” and “reveal hidden statements about social movements, 
anti-capitalist struggles, and the theoretical resources relied upon or developed in order to make 
sense of or discredit these movements and struggles” (pp. 1-2). Rather than the apocalypticism of 
capitalist realism that presents capitalism as an indomitable force, Bourassa begins his work with 
the ever-present fragility of neoliberal capitalism, a parasitic form of capital that relies not so 
much on exploitation but on appropriation. As such, Bourassa wants to produce forms of 
subjectivity autonomous from capital and its forms of life through postschool imaginaries. What 
I’m interested in, however, is how to nourish and enact a postdigital pedagogy in order to 
suspend postdigital capitalist time and free our subjectivity from its ensnarement in the present. 
The paper begins with an examination of the role of time in ordering society, and the role 
of capitalist production in ordering time. I characterize postdigital time—a capitalist 
temporality—as an incessant acceleration that acts to homogenize time and wed us to the present 
by making it so we have to constantly catch up to the present. While the impulse of this is no 
doubt economic (the realization of value), it is crucially undergirded by a pedagogical logic 
wherein we have to perpetually learn and relearn the latest apps, social media configurations, 
operating systems, and so on. After giving a concrete example of how this temporal regime 
reinforces imperialism and blocks resistance, I bring in two strategies of refusal: sleep and 
idleness/solidarity. Both of these slow down time—for the simple reason that they take time—so 
we can detach from the present. What these political and economic strategies need, however, is 
another educational mode of life, without which they cannot overcome the pedagogical logic of 
postdigital time. To do this, I call on Paolo Virno’s work on negation and articulate a pedagogy 
of suspension that initiates and sustains such a detachment, wresting us free from the never-
ending learning of the present. As an example of negation, the ‘not’ is a particularly powerful 
entry into suspension because of how fundamental it is to language and how omnipresent it is in 
practice. And yet the radical potential of this small word is constantly suppressed.  
The ‘not’ clears out oppositions and thereby exposes us to a radical indeterminacy and 
potentiality that is always untimely. On first pass, this is the temporal axis of what Tyson Lewis 
(2012) calls exopedagogy, a kind of pedagogy immanent in social movements that moves past 
the public/private binary and toward the common. Yet Virno’s writing on exodus draws out how 
his theory of negation augments exodus—and thereby exopedagogy—making it richer with even 
more alternatives and possibilities. To be specific, I argue that negation entails an exodus from 
exopedagogy, one that alters the meaning of the categories exopedagogy withdraws from 
(including the public and private). I present the factional struggle between the communists and 
professionalists inside the New York City Teachers Union to illustrate this exo-exopedagogy. 
Before concluding, I spend some time with Sandy Grande’s important critiques of Eurocentrism 
and progress in western critical education. I do this to demonstrate how negation as suspension 
helps circumvent these past errors through its accommodation of—or, better, insistence on—
variegated temporalities.  
 
Postdigital capitalist time 
 
Much more than an economic system, capitalism is a kind of temporal regime. Marx (1973) put 
it succinctly in his Grundrisse notebooks: “Economy of time, to this all economy ultimately 
reduces itself” (p. 173). Each society has to “order” time in at least one way, and in a society 
based on the maximization of profit, time is something—a commodity—with value insofar as it 
is that which allows for the production of surplus-value. The definition of capitalist value is, in 
fact, socially-necessary labor time, or the average duration of time it takes to produce a given 
commodity with the average skill, technology, and other conditions. Here, time is understood 
and experienced as chronological, wherein events unfold or develop in succession. A moment 
passes and another one arrives. That time is hegemonically configured as linear in education is 
confirmed by Anna Bennett and Penny Jane Burke (2017) in their study of time in higher 
education. They make a compelling argument that we need to reveal the taken for granted 
functioning of time as it is inscribed in the structures and relations of higher education by 
forefronting the historical and social construction of temporalities. They “highlight the 
importance of recognising that time does not exist apart from context and that it is not neutral; its 
constitutive parts are ontico-ontological” (p. 10). The plasticity of time is felt with the “speed 
up” of academia (Meyerhoff and Noterman, 2017). 
The speed of capitalist temporality, in other words, is ever accelerating, which isn’t a new 
phenomenon or something unique to the “neoliberal” era. As David Harvey (2010) reminds us, 
“we all too easily forget that the hour was largely an invention of the thirteenth century, that the 
minute and the second became common measures only as late as the seventeenth century and 
that it is only in recent times that terms like ‘nanoseconds’ have been invented” (p. 147). Faster 
is always better. If time is fixed absolutely (whether that be measured by days or the life of the 
sun), then the tendency is to speed-up time relatively. The proliferation of digital networked 
technologies not only accelerates the time of production, but more importantly it extends the 
influence of capitalist temporality to all of life. Jonathan Crary (2013) characterizes 
contemporary capitalism as a system and an ideology of 24/7, or “a generalized inscription of 
human life into duration without breaks, defined by a principle of continuous functioning. It is a 
time that no longer passes, beyond clock time” (p. 8). Defined by endless transitions and caught 
in a constant cycle of trying to catch up, the 24/7 “intensified rhythm precludes the possibility of 
becoming familiar with any given arrangement” (p. 37). What Crary identifies is how the 
temporal regime of postdigital capitalism weds us to the present by positioning us as constantly 
behind, and so always having to catch up to, the present. Faced with a constant deluge of data 
and an endless chronology of catastrophes, confronted by the need to constantly learn (and re-
learn) our media platforms, we feel a contradictory mix of helplessness and urgency that keeps 
us looped into postdigital capitalism. That this temporality is postdigital means that the time of 
digital technology is no longer “separate, virtual, ‘other’ to a ‘natural’ human and social life” 
(Jandrić et. al., 2018, p. 893).  
Maximilian Forte’s (2012) study of the 2011 US and NATO-led imperialist war on Libya 
provides us with an instance of the real and devastating implications of this relationship between 
postdigital time and the contemporary capitalist regime, and how it blocks resistance and 
eliminates time for reflection, strategy, and solidarity. The 2011 war against Libya was justified 
by an invented humanitarian emergency in which there was no time to do anything but act. Those 
of us in the West were told by our governments that a popular uprising against a brutal dictator 
was not only being suppressed, but was facing immanent genocide. Politicians and media like 
CNN and al-Jazeera (owned by anti-Gaddafi royalty in Qatar) spread unfounded claims about 
“Gaddafi bombing his own people.” There was no mention that both the US Secretary of 
Defense and a high-ranking admiral said there was “no confirmation of that” (p. 242). Forte’s 
study not only shows that the conflict in Libya could at best be described as a civil war, and 
worse (but more accurately) as a rebellion of racist, Islamist, and pro-Western segments of 
society against a popular leader who came to power in an anticolonial struggle.2 It also—and 
more importantly for the purposes of this paper—shows how the temporality of the campaign 
against Libya prevented any dissent. Even so-called critical and anti-war activists and 
intellectuals like Noam Chomsky and Chris Hedges got on board to support the war effort. To be 
sure, time wasn’t the only factor driving this constellation of forces, but it was an undergirding 
and enabling one. 
Both Crary and Forte identify resistance as entailing restraint. Forte concludes his book 
with a plea. “The next time that empire comes calling in the name of human rights,” he urges us, 
“please be found standing idly by” (p. 307). On the next morning we wake up to a new 
#SaveXYZ hashtag in our timelines accompanied by news articles and politicians condemning 
and calling for immediate and swift action against a head of state, political party, or any 
individual or grouping, we should refuse the invitation to retweet our outrage. Solidarity isn’t 
demanded immediately through blackmail (“you either support us or you support a baby-killing 
dictator!”) but produced through “communication, exchange reciprocity, mutual knowledge, and 
trust” (p. 264). All of this, of course, takes time. 
For Crary (2013), that which capitalism can never colonize or eliminate is sleep. Sure, 
capitalist can cut into our sleep, extend our working days through legal, illegal, and extralegal 
measures. It can degrade the quality and limit the quantity of our sleep, but it can never totally 
annihilate it. Sleep is also a necessarily a physical necessiaty and a social activity in which we 
are vulnerable to and dependent on others, and its common to us all. As the last barricade against 
24/7 capitalism, sleep is a “radical interruption,” and “a refusal of the unsparing weight of our 
global present where “the imaginings of a future without capitalism begin” (p. 128). Although 
Crary doesn’t expand on this much, I imagine sleep as a barricade precisely because it is a 
blocked terrain from which one advances. The point is not just to sleep, but to advance from 
sleep to slow down more generally so we can be detached from the present. Yet in order to 
advance from sleep, we need to address the pedagogical logic of postdigital capitalist time: 
lifelong learning. More than that, we need to develop an alternative educational mode so that we 
don’t merely sleep to wake back up to the same temporal regime. In what follows, I offer the 
suspension of negation as a pedagogical manner of initiating and sustaining such a detachment. 
 
Time as pedagogy 
 
There is a certain dominant temporality within educational institutions, settings, and relations in 
Western societies. Gert Biesta (2017) shows how the concepts of change, learning, development, 
schooling, the child, and progress are all fundamentally temporal in that they happen over time. 
Indeed, he notes that today time determines educational processes much more than any 
educational goals or content, as “the school day is over… when time is up, not when learning has 
finished” (p. 88). While Biesta homes in on time within the realm of education, there is a more 
generalized pedagogy of time, a phrasing I use to signal the educational force of time and how it 
disciplines us instead of the role of time in schooling and pedagogy. For example, under 
capitalism, time is commodified, endowed with an exchange value, something we can save, 
spend, waste, manage, give, and take. If we don’t or can’t discipline ourselves to time-as-
commodity, if we don’t or can’t match the speed of our bodies and minds to the speed of capital, 
then we are discounted, disabled, even annihilated. 
 Recent literature in philosophy of education identifies the contemporary educational 
ordering of society as the learning society, which tightly binds us to the future (Ford, 2018a, 
2018b; Lewis, 2017; Wozniak, 2016; 2017). As Tyson Lewis (2017) remarks, “The rhythm of 
learning is one that is always about the future, about guilt over the status of one’s debt” (p. 26). 
The crushing weight of debt that we must repay structures so much of our lives and determines, 
if not the decisions we make, at least the coordinates within which we make such decisions (“I 
would declare this major but I don’t think there will be employment opportunities,” or “these are 
the majors I can declare because they have strong employment outcomes”). Jason Wozniak 
(2016) shows how, “credit is a time-disciplining technique. Those who lend money appropriate 
the time of those to whom they lend” (p. 75). If money is a representation and store of (socially-
necessary) labor time, then credit is a claim on future labor-time.  Our future obligations 
structure and delimit our present actions, instituting a rhythm of linear time as exchange value 
(Wozniak, 2017). The problem, in sum, is that we are so securely wedded to and entrenched in 
the present via the future that revolutionary breaks and upheavals are unthinkable, or thinkable 
only as impossible. One pervading manifestation of this is lifelong learning, wherein we must 
perpetually learn in order to update our skills, habits, qualifications, knowledges, and so on in 
order to remain competitive. With debt always over our heads, the demand to always learn exerts 
an almost unbearable force on our lives. In fact, we can even learn better sleep habits so that we 
can better maximize our productivity for capital! There are all sorts of improvement guides out 
there in magazines, on websites, and in books to help us re-learn how to sleep to more 
appropriately accommodate the dictates of the marketplace (e.g., Stanley 2018).3 
A key task for those of us who want to create a post-capitalist world, then, concerns the 
theorization and enactment of alternative temporal pedagogies that function precisely to divorce 
us from the present. Negation is one such alternative, one that is particularly powerful because of 
how fundamentally it structures language and being. It’s powerful, that is, because it is a 
ubiquitous yet untapped presence. Negation in the marxist tradition is often synonymous with, or 
closely related to, opposition. Thus, in a famous passage from the end of the first volume of 
Capital, Marx (1867/1967) shows how individual private property is negated into its opposite of 
capitalist private property, which in turn is negated into the opposite, “the possession in common 
of the land and of the means of production” (p. 715). Communism is, in other words, the 
negation of its opposite, capitalism, and through the negation of the negation capitalism becomes 
communism. This is a limited sense of negation—inherited from Hegel (or a particular reading 
of Hegel—that tethers it to a dialectical process that progresses through the unfolding of 
contradictions. To break through 24/7 capitalist time, we need a more radical sense of negation. 
While we could pursue negation in a number of places—from Theodor Adorno to José Esteban 
Muñoz—I want to turn to a recent book  Paolo Virno to get to the politics, semiology, and the 
affect of the ‘not.’ This, in turn, helps me bridge the gap between time and politics via pedagogy. 
As a fundamental linguistic particle, ‘not’ passes through our minds, out from our 
mouths, and on our screens often and without thought or even notice. As Virno (2018) argues, 
however, the ‘not’ is the universal equivalent of language and a powerful ontological and 
affective actor. As he proffers, the ‘not’ “participates in the description of the world and 
determines to a great extent the form assumed by the actions and passions of the human animal” 
(p. 53). Negation, I want to propose, can be developed as a pedagogical mode of encountering 
others, ourselves, and the world in a way that attunes us not to what is but to what could be 
through an emphasis on what is not, and which, in so doing, unfastens us from the present and 
suspends the tempo of 24/7. To articulate such a pedagogy, however, we have to move from the 
classroom to the structure of language, before moving back into the public sphere. 
 Negation on this reading doesn’t signal what is opposite or contrary. To say that “I am 
not a good teacher” or “I do not like grading papers” does not mean that “I am a bad teacher” or 
“I hate grading papers.” The ‘not’ augments a predicate not by an antithesis but by “its 
opposition to all other signs, namely, by not being what they are” (p. 34). When I state, “I am not 
a good teacher,” I mean that, as a teacher, I am anything other than good. Not only could I be an 
excellent or a terrible teacher, but I could also be a sick teacher, a problematic teacher, a stupid 
teacher, an unreliable teacher; literally any other kind of teacher. Negation implies difference 
without end: “I am not a good teacher” only means “I am different from a good teacher.” There 
is no definition, only possibility and potentiality. And this is where the rich praxis of the not 
emerges: it opens up the subject and referent to an endless and infinite indeterminacy and 
potentiality. When it isn’t followed quickly by a clarification (“I am not a good teacher, I am an x 
teacher), when the negated semantic content is left hanging, so too are we. This is a minor 
pedagogical move. Its implications are not minor. 
 When negation isn’t explicitly activated, it’s still there as a condition of possibility of 
speaking and sense making. In this way, linguistic negation is thoroughly ontological, although it 
manifests as a present absence. In other words, it’s only because we can say that something is not 
that we can say that something is. Negation thus keeps open the gap between the world and 
signification, between meaning and sense. Virno likens it to the Hebrew vowel aleph that serves 
as a backing for words but cannot itself be said (or heard). Negation is ontological because it 
installs a gap between the world and word, between sense and meaning. For example, we only 
know what it means when I remark, “that was a bold essay” because of the primary lingering 
‘not’ before bold. This lingering ‘not’ stands in for the sum of the negative differences that 
constitute language.  “Ontological negation,” as Virno puts it, “institutes and preserves the 
neutrality of sense. By virtue of the gap that separates it from denotation and the illocutionary 
force (or, if you prefer, from the facts of the external world and psychic drives), the sense of a 
statement is always suspended between alternative developments, maintaining a perfect 
equidistance from them” (p. 81). Sense is separated from language and so concurrently 
positioned toward the ‘not’ and the content to which it is attached. This is not to say, of course, 
that all actions happen through language. 
Suspension is the praxis of negation, which means that negation operates by keeping 
sense indeterminate to meaning and signification. Rather than suppressing, disavowing, or 
annihilating the stated content, negation retains even that which is negated. This is a rule of 
negation. Virno writes that when stating, “I do not mean to offend you,” I am at the same time 
acknowledging my capacity to intentionally offend. “Rather than opposing and cancelling each 
other,” Virno sums up, “this knowledge and this refusal are mutually sustaining: I know my 
intention to offend precisely because I refuse it; I refuse such an intention precisely because I 
know it. Both knowledge and non-acceptance realize themselves in the negative statement ‘I 
have no intention to offend’” (p. 204). While the negation does not signal the contrary, it 
nonetheless sustains it. What is more, however, is that the operative negation also sustains all 
other potentialities. This is suspension in the fullest sense, without any exclusions whatsoever. 
The negation points to the stated content, the negated content, and everything else. In order to 
state “I am not studying” I must admit the act of “studying” into discourse and possibility even 
as I turn away from the act and toward everything besides studying. The most concise and 
indeterminate formulation here would be the double negative, “I am not not studying.” 
 
Negation as the temporal axis of exo-exopedagogy 
 
The ‘not’ enacts the non-contemporaneity of sense and being with the present, an ontological 
attribute increasingly hidden or mitigated against in the postdigital era, in which everything is 
present all the time. Crary (2013) is right to claim that “our time is the calculated maintenance of 
an ongoing state of transition” (p. 37, emphasis added). Transition isn’t new, of course, but 
historically between radical technological transitions there were periods of stability. While, say, 
the introduction of television inaugurated new kinds of social relations and perceptions, these 
were fixed for several decades. This is no longer the case in the postdigital age. Indeed, it’s 
difficult now to call any technological development radical or revolutionary, because we know 
another one is just around the corner. And the promises of technological developments 
advancing justice or equality or any real common value are now in tatters. 
 In this configuration, negation offers us a constant suspension that can form a resistance, 
one that complements idleness and sleep by betraying the reality of postdigital capitalist 
temporality.4 If we really were bound to the present then negation would be impossible, for there 
would be no gap between meaning and sense: 
 
The texture of any actuality, or presence, is assembled from environmental facts and 
emotional stimuli—from those facts and stimuli of which denotations and illocutionary 
forces are the doubles within statements. The autonomy of sense from denotation (i.e. 
from the fact) and from the illocutionary force (i.e. from the stimulus) thus implies its 
autonomy from all that we have good reason to consider as present. (Virno, 2018, p. 79) 
 
Negation’s praxis of suspension hinges on this non-contemporaneity and reveals and enacts the 
neutrality of sense. Negation allows for non-presence because it allows for that which is to be 
otherwise. If we could only ever affirm what is, then there would be no need for or possibility to 
be separated from the present. There would be no language, no difference, no possibility. The 
possible, as it turns out, always encompasses the its own negation: “When we say ‘It is possible 
that you love me,’ we also say at the same time ‘It is possible that you do not love me’” (p. 99).  
Through removing the subject from the present, the praxis of negation opens drives up to 
orientation and direction, potentially politicizing the drive and collectivizing the subject. In fact, 
negation conditions the intersection between epistemology and ontology, between word and 
action, the linguistic and non-linguistic. Negation is both “the logical tool that determines the 
discontinuity between linguistic praxis and drives” and “the key with which the former 
intervenes in the latter, altering their fate” (p. 180). There are two ways in which negation 
bridges drives and linguistic praxis. The first is as a threshold between the two, and the second is 
as an attachment that connects the two. In the first instance, the ‘not’ is located between the 
difference without positivity that makes language possible and the particular differences 
enunciated (between the being and the expression of language), while in the second instance it is 
located between what is done through language and what is done outside of language. These two 
are themselves linked: “negation enables the retroaction of statements on emotions and on 
instinctual behaviors only because it translates into a concrete discursive operation that 
detachment from the environment and that gap from the present that characterize language 
considered as a whole” (p. 185). Once subsumed under the praxis of negation, drives attain an 
independence and become susceptible to direction. 
To make this less abstract, Virno gives the example of pain. The affirmation of pain (“I 
am in pain”) is no more than a signal of a state, and so does not enable the independence or 
direction of the drive. The negation of pain (“I am not in pain”) frees the drive by divorcing it 
from the feeling of pain. Limited to the affirmation of pain, the affect only exists when present, 
and its articulation is limited to the expression of the feeling. When negated, however, “pain does 
not disappear but, separating itself from the particular circumstances that have caused it, often 
gives rise to the feeling of our enduring, and hence irredeemable, vulnerability” (p. 194). The 
subject is thus removed from the present of pain as the painful affect is subjected to multifarious 
deployments. Negation, to put it differently, opens the drive up as it gives form to it. It also 
generalizes the subjects vulnerability to pain, for it bring to consciousness that one can not be in 
pain, establishing a different relation to pain, which is now free.  Be that as it may, there is a 
distinct difference between this reality and our experiences, which leads Virno to declare that 
this difference or heterogeneity “acquires visibility and weight only when it asserts itself in 
praxis, transforming to a certain extent our vital conducts” (p. 206). There is the reality of 
negation, and the appearance of negation, and so the task is to show this struggle and to inhabit 
the gap in time opened up by the ‘not.’ This is one way in which to view the preparation for and 
inauguration of revolutionary events: the proclamation of the ‘not.’ 
At first blush, the pedagogy of negation emerges as a form of exopedagogy, or education 
as exodus (Lewis, 2012). Opposed to oppositional logic, exodus entails, as Virno (2008) 
formulates it, “Neither A, nor not-A, neither resigned acquiescence nor struggle to seize power in 
a predetermined territory, but an eccentric B, achievable only as long as other premises are 
surreptitiously introduced into the given syllogism” (p. 148). Exodus refuses the available 
choices—the stated semantic content and its contrary—and finds recourse in the endless 
indeterminacy of negation. Without sublating the alternatives (A or not-A), exodus instead alters 
the cartography of struggle, taking advantage of alleyways and improvised passages, and 
inventing new cuts through the space of power. Let’s take a strike as an example. During a strike, 
two sides (management and labor) struggle over wages, hours, and conditions. The options are to 
strike or fold, and the end-point for both sides is to reach a deal. An exodus from this situation 
wouldn’t necessarily mean abandoning the strike or even bargaining but would explore other 
options and therefore shift the coordinates of the struggle. Let’s say that during the strike the 
workers took over the factory and resumed production without the bosses. In this case, the 
framework for the struggle has shifted and yet the alterantives (strike or fold) are still in play. 
The position these alternatives play in the new terrain, however, are different than before, and the 
end-point of a successful agreement expressed through a new labor contract is no longer the only 
one available. The workers may decide to organize outside the union—through community 
organizations, religious groups, other unions, etc.—and expropriate the factory for good. 
Virno (2004) also calls exodus a defection, an exit, which has the advantage of 
“unrestrained invention which alters the rules of the game and throws the adversary completely 
off balance” (p. 70).  What’s interesting in this formulation is that Virno acknowledges an 
adversary—or opponent—while opposing opposition. This could easily be read as a 
contradiction, and perhaps it is. In fact, given what Virno tells us about negation, calling exodus 
“neither A, nor not-A,” makes exodus impossible, for there is nothing that is neither A nor not-A. 
A more generous reading, however, could see negation as enhancing and clarifying his earlier 
articulations of exodus. In modifying the terrain of conflict and antagonism, exodus actually 
alters both ends of A and the opposite of A. Stated otherwise, through moving within the 
suspension of the opposing alternatives, exodus redefines those very alternatives. What we have 
here is a thoroughly dynamic and relational conception of political struggle in which everything 
is on the table, even what appears to be off the table. 
Lewis (2012) defines exopedagogy as “a pedagogy that is immanent to social movements 
that are global in nature and breaks significantly with the dialectic of the public versus the 
private” (p. 845). Both the private and the public expropriate and limit the common, the former 
for private property (capital) and the latter for public property (the state). Unlike the private-
public dialectic, the common is a condition and end of production, in which what is produced 
returns to the common to enhance and extend it, in an intensifying spiral.5 Both capital and the 
state tame the surplus, and so block the productive capacities of the multitude as they deprive the 
multitude of its products. He identifies three moves that follow from this: politically (from 
citizen to pirate); metaphysically (from universal to the common, from particular to singular); 
and educationally (from judgment to decision) (p. 856). The educational philosophy that comes 
closest to the common is the deschooling of Ivan Illich. Illich removes education from the school 
in the same way that the common removes production from the public and the private. Lewis 
sees deschooling as “a piratical act that de-appropriates education as part of the commonwealth 
against the sanctity of public schooling and private interests” (p. 857). 
Negation adds a temporal dimension to the political, metaphysical, and educational 
components of exopedagogy at the same time as it opens exopedagogy into new (old) 
possibilities. Pedagogy thus requires a move from the present to the non-present. More than 
another dimension, however, negation is a praxis that in turn enables the other moves for which 
Lewis calls. In other words, it is only once we are divorced from the present that we can defect 
from capital and the state. Nonetheless, it also requires an exodus from exopedagogy—and thus 
an exo-exopedagogy—in that it alters the alternatives or dialectical oppositions of the 
framework itself. It does so by opening up what the private and the public, the pirate and the 
citizen, might mean once suspension wrests them free from the current landscape. It does so by 
attuning us to all the possibilities beyond deschooling when one says “schooling is not 
education” or “schooling is not liberating.” Thus, to wrest ourselves free from lifelong learning 
we may not abandon lifelong learning but rather negate it, keeping it in play but now susceptible 
to infinite alterations; exploring the infinite potentiality of lifelong learning. 
This is one way to read the factional struggle between the communists and 
professionalists inside the New York City Teachers Union (TU). Founded in 1916, the TU 
became a formidable articulation of broader social struggles beginning in the 1930s. The victory 
of the communist faction in the union was a key part of the strength of the union. The union 
administration was always progressive, but when the communists began to organize within the 
union, they pushed the union further to the left precisely by opening up what a teacher was. The 
administration “emphasized professionalism, collaboration with management, and legislation as 
ways of improving the working conditions for teachers,” while the communists “did not view 
teachers as professionals but as members of the industrial working class whose major objective 
was to take part in the struggle against capital” (Taylor, 2011, p. 16). The administration wanted 
to maintain the identity of the teacher, which entailed not only a collaborationist orientation 
toward the Board of Education, but more fundamentally limiting membership to full-time 
licensed teachers. The communists wanted to open membership up and to organize substitute, 
part time, and other non-licensed teachers. This followed the third party and then popular front 
lines of the Communist International, which called on communists to prioritize building mass 
movements. The communists won the internal struggle and membership surged. They did not 
abandon their identity as teachers, but opened the identity up in the hopes of radically 
reformatting the very coordinates that determined what a teacher was and could be. In other 
words, the communist teachers were not teachers. 
 
 
Past times 
 
Against the constant speeding-up of postdigital capitalist time, the suspension of negation 
interrupts the onslaught of transition and the constant catching up (and re-learning) we have to 
do. Yet what is particularly useful about Virno’s work on negation is that it isn’t a call for 
opposition or overturning, nor is it an uncritical celebration of the new or the different. It firmly 
breaks with a narrative of progress that structures so many variants of critical education. 
Negation, after all, is precisely not the inversion of the present for a new future; it’s a 
heterogeneous operation that preserves, suspends, and innovates. The final move I want to make 
in this paper is to draw out how the temporal pedagogy of negation guards against Eurocentric 
and colonial narratives of progress and teleology through its release of heterogeneous 
temporalities and potentialities.6 
Sandy Grande (2004) most forcefully highlights the danger of these narratives in 
education, including its various critical components. Her work is particularly important—and yet 
seldom considered—in educational philosophy, because it emphasizes how the most well-known 
philosopher of education, John Dewey’s educational philosophy “presumed the colonization of 
indigenous peoples” in that his conceptions of democracy and nation—around which his 
educational philosophy flowed—were “built upon the notion of ever-expanding possibility” (p. 
33)—the frontier.7 Further, for those of us on the Left, Grande both provides critiques of marxist 
and socialist politics while at the same time holding open the possibility that educational 
practices in this tradition can “inform indigenous struggles for self-determination” (p. 33). She is 
specifically interested in the project of revolutionary critical pedagogy, which she partly defends 
against what she says are unfounded critiques by Samuel Bowers.8 
 Grande finds many of Bowers’ critiques against critical pedagogy to be justified, as 
“critical pedagogy is born of a Western tradition that has many components in conflict with 
indigenous cosmology and epistemology, including a view of time and progress that is linear and 
an anthropocentrism that puts humans at the center of the universe” (p. 88). She is more 
sympathetic to revolutionary critical pedagogy, which turns away from the Frankfurt School and 
back to Marx. Thus, revolutionary critical pedagogy doesn’t valorize change in general (not all 
change is desirable). Yet she still cautions that this pedagogy “is prone to promulgating its own 
oppressive grand narratives by dismissing indigenous cultures as ‘primitive’ or precapitalist 
entities” (p. 88). In addition, the project “is conceived of inherently as a rights-based as opposed 
to a land-based project” (p. 116). And it seems, when many Leftists do turn to land they do so in 
a colonial way. This is Glen Coulthard’s critique of the project of commoning in colonial settler-
states, as “the so-called commons are actually occupied lands that the First Nations have been 
struggling to recover for centuries” (Malott, 2016, p. 16). 
 What is considered “marxism” in academia, however, is a very limited and narrow field 
that is absolutely dominated by white men, particularly from Western Europe, such as the 
Frankfurt School theorists. But as Asad Haider reminds us in his book, Mistaken Identity, “the 
insights of this brilliant thinker, Karl Marx, did not belong to Europe… They had been refined 
and developed in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Even here in the belly of the beast… black 
Americans had shown that this legacy could not be geographically confined” (p. 3). In other 
words, Benjamin, Bloch, Adorno, Virno, Negri, or Hardt don’t have a monopoly on marxism 
(isn’t it curious that theorists who haven’t participated in the revolutions they write about carry 
more authority in academia than the ones who have participated and even led those revolutions, 
many of whom are indigenous to their land?) Harry Harootunian (2015) locates the fundamental 
error of Western marxism with a “preoccupation with a matured capitalism,” which “risked 
sacrificing historical capitalism, if not the historical itself, as a subject of inquiry” (p. 5). 
Harootunian presents a careful reading of Marx, Lenin, José Carlos Mariátegui, Wang Yanan, 
Moritarō Yamada, and others to demonstrate the rich, complex, and variegated historical account 
of marxism and the politics that follow. 
 A central problem with Western marxism is that it reads Marx’s analysis of formal and 
real subsumption as a historical account rather than as an analytical model. Formal subsumption 
is when capitalism takes what comes before it and subjects it to its logics (and pursues absolute 
surplus value). Under real subsumption, capitalism now produces what came before it and the 
production process is totally subsumed under capitalism as the search for relative surplus value 
begins. Under real subsumption, that is, all of production totally determined by capital. This is, 
for example, what provides the basis of Negri’s autonomism and his recent work with Michael 
Hardt, in which the social or biopolitical has been totally subsumed by capital, to which there is 
no more outside.9 Harootunian importantly maintains that real subsumption was merely a model 
for Marx so that he could imagine what a totalized capitalism would look like, which would then 
enable him to articulate the components of such a system. At worst, real subsumption was a 
projection into the future. Harootunian argues that Lukács and later the Frankfurt School saw the 
commodity-form in all of society (assuming real subsumption had been realized) so that the 
commodity’s “role had been transformed into one of a central performer in structuring modern 
social life” and “it had become more complex, inasmuch as it now frequently was made to 
exceed the form of wage labor and the objectification of social relationships. It now involved 
culture in the broadest sense” (p. 37).10 It’s not hard to see how this informs theories of mass 
consumption, one-dimensional beings, and so on.  
 In reality, however, Marx saw capitalism as “housing” “a vast, heterogeneous inventory 
and ‘conjuncture’ of temporalities no longer stigmatized for having been cast out of time but 
rather as expressions of contretemps, simultaneous nonsimultaneities… contemporaneous 
noncontemporaneities or uneven times, and zeitwidrig, time’s turmoil, times out of joint” (p. 23). 
Nothing perhaps reveals Marx’s temporal openness as his suggestion that surviving communes in 
19th century Russia as progressive relative to capitalism. Particularly in his Grundrisse 
notebooks of the late 1950s, Marx “rejected any linear causality that envisaged a singularly 
progressive movement from one period or mode of production to the next… but rather saw the 
multilinear movements as taking place in different regions and among diverse peoples” (p. 48). It 
was these insights that thinkers in the Global South and elsewhere latched onto and developed. 
To give just one example, Mariátegui’s historical account of Peru accounted for indigenous 
communities, forms of common ownership or cultivation, Spanish colonial feudalism, and a 
republican capitalism. This was made possible exactly “because Marxism was open to diverse 
regional historical experiences that historical materialism had to account for, instead of 
remaining narrowly constrained by a singular and singularizing dogmatic discourse applied to all 
situations” (p. 140). 
The temporal goal of socialism is to abolish capitalism’s abstraction of time, the way that 
it imposes a homogenous temporality on people through force. By expropriating land and labor, 
capital today disciplines us into a 24/7 temporal regime. But discipline is never total, and 
resistance always persists. The non-presence of negation is a pedagogical manner of combatting 
24/7 capitalist time in order to disrupt it not for the sake of disruption, but to allow for other 
temporalities, possibilities, and forms of life to emerge. For this reason, negation is a marxist 
practice in that it calls for, invites, and enacts nonlinear and disparate times. What’s important to 
note here is that these alternatives are not only new or unforeseen alternatives. To be sure, 
suspension is definitely not any kind of march forward to overcome the past, and it doesn’t 
operate according to the logic or dictate of the one. As an exodus from exopedagogy, the 
suspension of negation redefines the “citizen” from which Lewis urges educational philosophy to 
move to forms of belonging and forms of sovereignty that are totally separate from and precede 
the capitalist state. Exopedagogy as exodus thus does not ignore or preclude, but precisely makes 
space for non-Western forms of citizenship and publicness in a non-deterministic way. As such, 
the pedagogy of the ‘not’ is a bountiful and much needed praxis for coalitions and united fronts 
in political and social struggles against postdigital capitalism today, and a pedagogy of the not 
can counter the lifelong learning dictates that prop up the postditigal capitalist temporal regime. 
  This is not the end. 
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1 For the first example, think of Twitter’s banning of promoted ads by Russia Today and Sputnik (two sources 
highly critical of the U.S. government), or Facebook’s censoring of Safa, a Gaza-based news site. For the second 
example, think of when the Egyptian regime of Hosni Mubarak blocked social media. In the case of Iran in 2009, the 
U.S. intervened and got Twitter to delay scheduled maintenance so that the U.S.-friendly and backed Green 
Movement could continue coordinating protests and attacks. For more on this, see the introduction in Ford (2018a). 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 This isn’t unique to Libya at all. The same thing happened (and is happening) with Syria, and it’s only a matter of 
time until it happens (again) with Iran, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea), and so on. For more on Libya, see Ford (2015). 
3 Some contest the claim that we sleep less today than previously (e.g., Horne 2011). This research identifies that our 
“sleep deficit” has less to do with a lack of sleep and more to do with the stress and pace of our live (Horne 2011, p. 
3). Horne importantly critiques a romancization of past sleep times. In fact, when one reads testimony about 
working conditions in English factories in the 17th and 18th centuries, it’s clear that sleep duration was far from ideal. 
What this research doesn’t challenge is that there is an inherent antagonism between sleep and capital. 
4 I mean ‘betray’ in both senses of the word: both to break from and to reveal. 
5 For more on education and the common, see De Lissovoy (2011), Ford (2015), Gautreaux (2017), and Slater 
(2015). 
6 Curry Malott (2016) provides a careful consideration of Indigenous critiques of marxism in his book’s first 
chapter. 
7 This is not to imply that settler-colonialism isn’t considered in education. For examples of this, see the work of 
Troy Richardson (e.g., 2007; 2012) and the work of the Latin American Philosophy of Education Society. Noroozi 
(2016) uses Derrida to address the relationship between pedagogy, time, and the decolonial. 
8 See chapter 2 in Grande (2004), especially pages 80-88. 
9 See in particular chapter 2.6 of Empire (Hardt and Negri, 2000).  
10 It’s important to note here that Harootunian acknowledges that Lukács’ theories were more complex, and he deals 
with them elsewhere in his book. 
